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Abstract over the last two years Germany has experienced a significant growth of 
nationalist, anti-islamic and xenophobic forces. while the movement patriotic Europe-
ans against the islamisation of the west (patriotische Europäer gegen die islamisierung 
des abendlandes, pEGiDa) has been mobilising protest on the ground in the Saxon 
capital, the alternative for Germany (alternative für Deutschland, afD) has continually 
increased its number of seats in state parliaments, with a fundamental rejection of the 
refugee policy of the federal government. Since the election of a new leadership of the 
afD in the summer of 2015, one can observe signs of rapprochement between these 
two organisations. in this paper i argue that the afD and pEGiDa are two sides of the 
same coin. Further approximation and collaboration will depend on the outcome of last-
ing internal power struggles inside the afD.
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Introduction
Compared to its neighbours, Germany is a latecomer when it comes to having a rel-
evant and nationwide right-wing populist party. attempts to establish such parties previ-
ously were either locally or temporarily restricted, or failed because of resistance from 
the established democratic forces, including the media. Moreover, far-right parties suf-
fered from internal disputes over leadership and strategy, and problems demarcating 
themselves from the right-wing extremist camp. Their major problem was, however, that 
they could not build up alliances with like-minded social movements.
Things changed with the foundation of the alternative for Germany (alternative für 
Deutschland, afD) in april 2013 and the patriotic Europeans against the islamisation of 
the west (patriotische Europäer gegen die islamisierung des abendlandes, pEGiDa) 
movement, which entered the scene for the first time in october 2014 in Dresden, the 
capital of Saxony. although these two events were separated by a gap of more than a 
year, and although in the beginning the afD was primarily an anti-euro protest party with 
some nationalist and anti-immigration influences that it tried very hard to repress, some 
representatives of the party’s nationalist wing, such as the leaders of the afD group 
in the state parliaments of Brandenburg and Thuringia, alexander Gauland and Björn 
Höcke, respectively, immediately recognised pEGiDa as a natural ally (Vorländer et al. 
2016, 40; Korsch 2016a, 120). at the top level, however, the leaders of both organisa-
tions at this time were reluctant to move closer together.
Bernd Lucke and other afD officials of the misleadingly labelled ‘economic-liberal’ wing1 
were sceptical about the true character of pEGiDa, considering it too xenophobic, too 
nationalist and too radical, and therefore repellent to potential voters. For their part, the 
hardcore pEGiDa activists accused the Lucke-led afD of being too accommodating. pEGi-
Da’s front man, Lutz Bachmann, insulted the afD, even calling it a toothless mainstream 
party (Korsch 2016a, 114). The indifferent relationship between the afD and pEGiDa 
cooled even further when Frauke petry, then chair of the afD in Saxony and leader of the 
afD parliamentary group in the Saxon parliament, called for Bachmann’s immediate resig-
nation, after the pEGiDa founder labelled refugees ‘scum and brutes’ and posted Hitler-
posed selfies on social media (Korsch 2016a, 121–2). His reaction was instant: Bachmann 
declared the afD a mainstream party of careerists that was no longer an ally.
The relationship between the two organisations was close to a complete breakdown 
when pEGiDa decided to compete against the afD with a candidate of its own in the 
1 Bernd Lucke and his party fellows Hans-olaf Henkel and Joachim Starbatty—all Members of the Euro-
pean parliament now in the afD splinter group alliance for progress and Departure—justified their rejection 
of the euro with their obtrusively claimed economic expertise, even though, while the members of that wing 
of the party certainly advocated a liberal market economy, Lucke, at least, was the opposite of a ‘liberal’. His 
leadership of the party closely resembled a dictatorship, and documents show that he sat on a radicalisation 
strategy in order to heat up protest potential for street mobilisation and to mobilise right-wing and xeno-
phobic voters (Spiegel Online 2015a, b). under his leadership the afD campaigned with right-wing populist 
slogans (‘no immigration to the German welfare state’, ‘guarded and safe borders instead of border crime’, 
and so forth), and Lucke carefully considered cooperation with pEGiDa for a while to exploit this potential 
(Korsch 2016a, 118).
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elections for the mayor of Dresden, the home base of the movement, in June 2015, with 
the result that the pEGiDa candidate gathered twice as many votes as the candidate 
of the afD (although both failed to reach the run-off). nonetheless, after an inner-party 
revolt against Lucke and his wing, and the election of a new leadership in July 2015, 
the afD changed its position regarding pEGiDa and approached the movement openly. 
after the election of petry as one of the party’s two speakers, right-wing representative 
Marcus pretzell celebrated the afD as ‘the pEGiDa party’ (Vorländer et al. 2016, 41).
in this paper i argue that, at least since the election of the new afD leadership, the 
party and pEGiDa have come to be two sides of the same coin, although the pEGiDa 
speakers have been more radical in their behaviour since the beginning. The two organ-
isations benefit from the same overall political trends, primarily concerning the refugee 
crisis. They address the same issues, they have the same demands, they share the 
same bogeyman and they use the same style of propaganda. afD officials and pEGiDa 
speakers have repeatedly attacked representatives of the state personally and in highly 
offensive ways. Finally, a large proportion of pEGiDa’s followers prefer the afD above 
all other German parties (patzelt 2016b, 183–6).
at present, closer cooperation between pEGiDa and the afD is not guaranteed, 
although mutual contacts have intensified over recent months (Spiegel Online 2016; 
weiland 2016b; Zeit Online 2016). However, deeper cooperation depends on devel-
opments inside the afD, which is—again—being shaken by an intense dispute about 
leadership. if the wing around the challenged party co-speaker Frauke petry should win 
the inner-party power struggle, the hesitant back-and-forth relationship with pEGiDa 
could last. But if the nationalist wing of her challengers were to gain more influence, an 
outcome that seems to be likely at present, i argue, pEGiDa and the afD will probably 
converge further, assuming that pEGiDa does not disintegrate. in that scenario the afD 
would become the parliamentary arm of the movement, with pEGiDa serving as the 
societal bridgehead of the party. in this case, Germany will have an aggressive right-
wing and anti-system party—within several state parliaments, at least—and an obscure 
movement outside that gathers and mobilises dissatisfied, grumbling, politically home-
less, nationalist and xenophobic-minded people who are afraid of the future.
For the remaining part of this paper i will briefly describe the characteristics of the two 
organisations under study. Then i will summarise the recent signs of approximation. 
The last section will consider how the democratic parties could deal with growing unrest 
from the right.
PEGIDA: the mobilisation of detached people 
by political entrepreneurs
in this movement it is necessary to distinguish between the organisers and the spokes-
persons, on the one hand, and the followers, on the other. one half of the organisers 
and speakers are predominantly parvenus with either a difficult or a simple past, and 
176
 EuropEan ViEw (2016) 15:173–181
with links to the security business and the red-light milieu (Zeit Magazin 2015). prior to 
joining pEGiDa, Bachmann made his way in various small jobs and gained notice for 
some petty crimes (assault, theft). He was supported by rené Jahn, a caretaker; Kath-
rin oertel, a freelance property consultant; and achim Exner, a security businessman, 
who have all since left pEGiDa after disputes with Bachmann in the interim. The inner 
circle consisted additionally of Frank ingo Friedemann, a failed businessman; Siegfried 
Däbritz, the operator of a small pension in Meißen, a city close to Dresden; and Edwin 
wagensveld, the owner of a mail-order business for pneumatic guns, self-defence prod-
ucts and outdoor equipment (Vorländer et al. 2016, 31–3).
other pEGiDa spokespersons were notorious far-right activists, such as Götz 
Kubitschek, the owner of a small publishing business through which he distributes the 
right-wing magazine Sezession. The former first lieutenant of the Bundeswehr (unified 
armed forces) is known to have links to numerous networks of the radical right in Ger-
many and as the co-founder of the institute for State policy (institut für Staatspolitik), 
which is considered to be the think tank of the right-wing milieu in Germany (Backes 
2012).
at the very beginning it was unclear what pEGiDa stood for. The only hint about its 
goals was the name—some people against the islamisation of the west. The first call 
for a demonstration under this slogan via Facebook mobilised some hundred followers, 
but their numbers grew weekly to a peak of roughly 25,000 in January 2015. By that 
time pEGiDa had published some position papers. Together with the contents of the 
speeches, it was possible to identify pEGiDa’s messages.
The movement fights a kind of Kulturkampf (cultural war) to protect Germans against 
an ‘ethnic redeployment’ (‘Umvolkung’). it warns against foreign infiltration, primarily by 
(Muslim) immigrants and refugees; the loss of German identity because of the steady 
islamisation of public life (‘turbo islamisation’); parallel societies; and the threat of the 
introduction of Sharia, and it links crime with immigration (Vorländer et al. 2016, 36; 
Korsch 2016b, 143; patzelt 2016a, 72–100). all these positions have been connected 
with severe attacks against the federal government, especially the chancellor and the 
minister of justice, Heiko Maas,2 who have been accused of selling out Germany to 
Muslims and forgetting the needs and worries of the concerned citizens, while the 
media have not dared to report these needs or have done so in a biased way (‘lying 
press’). pEGiDa has demanded limits on immigration, immediate restrictions to asylum 
regulations, border controls, zero tolerance in cases of abuse of the right to asylum, 
stringent deportation of criminal foreigners, and significantly more staff and equipment 
for police forces to increase public safety. Demands of the second order, appearing less 
frequently in documents and speeches, have called for referenda, the rejection of the 
2 Heiko Maas was among the first prominent politicians to condemn the pEGiDa marches and messages, 
having denounced them as a ‘shame for Germany’ early in 2015. Since that time he has been bogeyman 
number one at pEGiDa marches. This reveals the pEGiDa speakers’ kind of thinking, including how they 
link their attacks against the minister with nazi comparisons. in a speech on 4 July 2016 in Dresden, Sieg-
fried Däbritz, one of the hardcore radical pEGiDa speakers, referred to Heiko Maas as ‘Josef’, by which he 
meant the former Reichsminister of propaganda, Josef Goebbels.
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Transatlantic Trade and investment partnership (presumably as representative of a loss 
of national sovereignty), and declarations of understanding and sympathy for the rus-
sian president, in tandem with a call for the ‘normalisation’ of German–russian relations 
(Vorländer et al. 2016, 36; Korsch 2016b, 143; patzelt 2016a, 72–100).
as we know, these claims have mobilised up to 25,000 followers, who each Monday 
cheer on their spokespersons. research has shown that this crowd does not consist 
entirely of xenophobes, racists or people with far-right attitudes, but followers who are 
highly receptive to the messages sent out by Bachmann and his fellows. The majority 
of pEGiDa followers are men from Dresden, mainly between 30 and 60 years of age, 
employed, with a medium or even higher formal education and with a regular income; 
this group is followed by male pensioners. They feel disappointed and completely mis-
represented by the established political parties. They have lost all trust in the govern-
ment and the media, support claims for direct democracy, are afraid of the future in 
general and islam in particular, and they show—if any political inclination—considerable 
sympathies for the afD (Daphi et al. 2015; Vorländer et al. 2016, 57–68). it appears that 
it was only in the Saxon capital and its surrounding areas that there was a critical mass 
of detached and angry people who could be mobilised, goaded and used by political 
entrepreneurs such as Lutz Bachmann and his fellows, who have discovered a new 
calling in running a business as brokers of uncertainty, worry and indignation.
The AfD: a torn party moving further to the right
The short history of the afD has been marked by internal struggles of competing wings 
and splinter groups, and ongoing disputes over leadership. From the very beginning 
the party was torn between two competing wings. The first was made up of those 
loyal to the founder, Bernd Lucke; it was primarily in favour of Germany’s exit from the 
eurozone. Then there was a nationalist wing that formed around Frauke petry, Mar-
cus pretzell, alexander Gauland, Björn Höcke and others, who wore down Lucke with 
their nationalist and xenophobic statements and lack of loyalty. at the party convention 
in July 2015, petry and Jörg Meuthen, an economist, were elected as the new lead-
ers. The Lucke camp founded a new party, the alliance for progress and Departure 
(allianz für Fortschritt und aufbruch), and have paled into insignificance, except for the 
fact that Lucke, together with three others, represents this minor party in the European 
parliament.
The election of petry was seen as a move further to the right. First, her home branch, 
the afD in Saxony, is considered to be one of the anti-islamic forerunners of the pre-
sent-day afD. From the start, the Saxony party linked immigration with crime and 
emphasised—among other things—strict border controls and the deportation of crimi-
nals (Korsch 2016b, 144). Second, in early 2016 petry revealed herself to be a taboo-
breaking radical when she demanded that the German border police use firearms to 
prevent ‘illegal crossings’ of the German borders by refugees. This same idea was set 
forth—with a slight variation—by speaker Tatjana Festerling at a pEGiDa demonstra-
tion on 22 February 2016, and was celebrated by the demonstrators (Meisner 2016). 
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Third, the new leaders did not suspend the nationalists for their right-wing–inspired 
statements and in some cases actively participated in their meetings. when in May of 
2016 the still-acting co-speaker Jörg Meuthen returned from a visit to the patriotic plat-
form (patriotische plattform, pp), the podium of the nationalist right wing of the party, he 
declared that he felt very comfortable with the platform (weiland 2016a).
at the same time the party celebrated remarkable success in the state elections in 
Baden-wurttemberg, rhineland-palatinate and Saxony-anhalt, where the party’s 
right-wing representative andré poggenburg was elected as a member of parliament. 
Together with Hans-Thomas Tillschneider, another member of parliament from Saxony-
anhalt and a member of the pp, poggenburg, Gauland and Höcke are working on a 
strategy aimed at bringing about a xenophobic and nationalist radicalisation of the afD. 
Höcke is fighting a kind of a crusade against the hypothetical islamisation of Germany 
(Grabow 2016), while Gauland is using racist prejudices as a provocation. For example, 
he openly racially attacked German soccer player Jérôme Boateng (‘people like to see 
him playing but they won’t have such guys in their neighbourhood’. See wehner and 
Lohse 2016).
Yet even petry, once the figurehead of the national right-wingers of the party, is 
under pressure. on the one hand, she has broken with her co-chair, Meuthen, primarily 
because of a power-struggle for party leadership. Meuthen himself gave an additional 
reason for that conflict when he founded a new parliamentary group in the state parlia-
ment of Baden-wurttemberg after the afD group had split over a dispute about the anti-
Semitic, inflammatory writings of one of its members. on the other hand, petry is under 
observation by the nationalist hardliners, who are lurking and waiting for the proper 
moment to take control of the party.
Recent signs of rapprochement
at present the afD is paralysed by internal power games. nevertheless, the nationalist 
hardliners are gaining in influence. They share a number of common positions with the 
organisers of pEGiDa, including their hatred of the federal government. Then there are 
the repeated pronouncements that Germany is going to be overwhelmed by an aggres-
sive and brutalised islam; that German women are endangered by sexually uninhibited 
male Muslims; that crime caused by refugees and asylum seekers is going up; and that 
a cartel of silencers comprised of the established democratic parties and the media are 
suppressing ‘people’s voices, will and worries’; and so forth. Meanwhile, the movement 
does the ‘dirty’ fieldwork, and the afD squad works—apart from some public remarks—
rather silently, in order not to make any strategic mistakes. However, one can state that 
there are some clear signs of approximation between the afD and pEGiDa, even while 
it seems that the actual leader of the afD, like her predecessor, is losing control over 
crucial parts of her party.
The first to recognise pEGiDa as part of a common movement was Björn Höcke. 
For him, pEGiDa ‘is the bridgehead of the afD in Dresden’ (Zeit Online 2016). without 
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pEGiDa the afD was not that strong, said Höcke in april 2016, and he thanked the 
movement for their important fieldwork. This was the initial spark for mutual visits by afD 
officials to pEGiDa demonstrations and vice versa. afD representative and pp member 
Tillschneider spoke at a pEGiDa demonstration in May 2016, where he repeated the 
thanks and mentioned that pEGiDa’s messages are now part of the afD’s position on 
islam, that is, ‘no to islam!’ (Spiegel Online 2016). under Lucke and then under petry 
in the early days of her leadership, if afD members participated at pEGiDa events they 
did so privately, whereas the pp faction of the afD now seeks to close ranks. Shortly 
after Tillschneider’s speech at the pEGiDa demonstration, pEGiDa speaker Siegfried 
Däbritz accepted an invitation by Höcke to speak at a public afD event in Erfurt, the 
capital of Thuringia. Later, Höcke said that the two organisations share many common 
goals, which must be made visible by at least symbolic acts (weiland 2016a).
according to patzelt (2016b, 186), the afD and pEGiDa are ‘flesh of the same flesh’. 
This conclusion should be modified insofar as it holds true for the radical hardcore 
organisers of pEGiDa and the pp group within the afD and its mentors such as Höcke. 
For them, pEGiDa is a beneficial bridgehead into parts of the Saxon lower middle class 
(and, by the way, an instrument able to weaken petry’s authority inside the party), while 
pEGiDa, for its part, is looking for a parliamentary arm for its messages. whether the 
approximation continues depends a great deal on the result of the ongoing conflicts 
inside the afD.
Counter strategies
as is well known, there is no fast-acting medicine against populist movements and par-
ties, because the reasons for their foundation and growth cannot be changed overnight. 
Concerning right-wing populist parties, it seems plausible for established democratic 
parties, especially those that are in government, to deliver good policy outcomes—that 
means solving given problems in a manner that is good for the country and the majority 
of the people. Moreover, democratic forces should confront the right-wing and national 
populists, with their weak ideas. They are more or less complete naysayers and prob-
lem-seekers, not problem-solvers. The majority of their positions are either artificially 
constructed or do not fit the degree of complexity of the given challenges. There is no 
guarantee that the combination of these two approaches will work, but there is no rea-
son for any democratic party to be afraid of an open confrontation with the political for-
tune seekers and demagogues of the right, provided that the established parties deliver.
The situation of pEGiDa is even more complicated because a large proportion of the 
followers do not seem to be amenable to reason. whether problem-solving and good 
government can ease their frustration and alienation cannot be predicted with certainty. 
we can safely assume, however, that the mindset and the motivation of the pEGiDa 
organisers can never be changed. alarming, defaming, and exaggerating problems and 
worries linked to xenophobic, islamophobic or racist prejudices constitutes their per-
sonal business plan, which works as long as it finds a receptive audience. as long as 
the organisers do not fail on account of their own weakness, it seems that Germany 
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must put up with these protest marches and the messages that are sent out from the 
Saxon capital, because this is a legal, though unpleasant, part of democracy.
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